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Frederick 2013 (F13) offers criticisms of the Lester 2012 (L12) theory of libertarian 
liberty and of its compatibility with preference-utilitarian welfare and private-
property anarchy. This reply to F13 first explains the underlying philosophical 
problem with libertarian liberty and L12‟s solution. It then goes through F13 in detail 
showing that it does not grasp the problem or the solution and offers only 




This essay is a reply to Frederick 2013, “A Critique of Lester‟s Account of Liberty.” 
Frederick 2013 (F13) attempts to offer a rigorous criticism of the theory of libertarian liberty 
in Lester [2000] 2012 (L12). However, it is immediately noticeable in the “references” that 
F13 does not give the full title (it omits the subtitle) or the name of the author as they appear 
on L12, or the exact publisher‟s name (it is “The University of Buckingham Press”). All 
trivial, of course, but indicating a lack of precision. F13 references six “critical reviews” of 
L12, although there have been at least twelve. And there are replies to all twelve of those 
reviews, which rebut all criticisms while adding useful elucidations. All of these replies 
might easily be located online in moments.
1
 F13 does not list even one of these twelve 
replies. Consequently, F13 appears to be completely uninformed by these replies (unless all 
references to them were for some reason omitted). Moreover, since the original book in 2000, 
there have been many additional essays by the same author that must now also be said to be 
part of what F13 calls “Lester‟s account of liberty.”2 These basic oversights do not bode well. 
And, as is evident on going through F13, its criticisms invariably aim at inaccurate 
paraphrases and misinterpretations. Consequently, there is no criticism that cannot be 
rebutted. F13 is mainly remarkable for managing to sustain at such great length the 
combination of a fundamental misrepresentation of everything it criticises with supreme 
confidence that it has totally mastered it. However, the greatest fault is one that is shared by 
all of the other critical reviews: there is simply no apparent grasp of the philosophical 
problem with libertarian liberty or how L12‟s theory of liberty is supposed to solve it. 
Therefore, the only way that F13 might be mistaken for any kind of genuine refutation would 
be by a reader making the same errors it does, or—which is more likely—taking on trust the 
specious rigour and confident claims of F13. 
L12 is neither simple nor orthodox. And because there is so much ground covered, 
many matters that could fill a substantial article are often dealt with in a paragraph or two 
(verbum sapienti satis est
3
). It is extremely easy to misunderstand it. Therefore, it usefully 
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clarifies the relevant theories and arguments to reply to any misunderstandings. And if there 
were no reply, then undoubtedly F13 would be more likely to be perceived as a refutation. 
However, F13 might have been much more economical and relevant if it had only focused 
more briefly on what it takes to be the main problem, rather than misrepresenting L12 ad 
nauseam in a plethora of unnecessary detail. The reply appears here rather than in the same 
periodical in order to avoid problems with bowdlerisation, censorship, ad hominems, 
uninformed or inattentive criticisms, and irrelevant explanatory demands. 
It should be useful to begin with a brief explanation of the main philosophical 
problem with libertarian liberty, and then of the offered solution to that problem. This is done 
partly because there is considerable confusion among libertarians generally about the 
problem although there is even more confusion about the suggested solution, where it has 
been noticed at all. This is analogous with the problem of epistemological justification and 
the critical-rationalist solution.
4
 Moreover, the issues here do not appear to be of any less 
philosophical, practical, or moral importance. 
 
The crucial philosophical problem with libertarian liberty 
 
The problem can be explained as follows. Some kinds of property are assumed to be 
compatible with interpersonal liberty: e.g., self-ownership, initial acquisition by use, 
acquisition by trade, etc. Other kinds of property are assumed to be incompatible with 
interpersonal liberty: e.g., slavery by seizure, acquisition by conquest, acquisition by theft 
and fraud, etc. How are the different kinds of property being distinguished as libertarian or 
not libertarian? It cannot be because certain kinds of property are merely defined, whether 
explicitly or tacitly, as compatible with the mere word „liberty‟: for words, as such, are of 
little or no importance. It must be because they are thought to be factually compatible or 
incompatible with real liberty: for the word „liberty‟ refers to real phenomena in the world 
just as much as does the word „light‟. But libertarians usually have no explicit theory of what 
such liberty is. So they must have a tacit theory of liberty. And that tacit theory has to be 
independent of „property‟ (in a de facto, non-moral, and non-legal sense, of „exclusive 
resource-control‟). Otherwise, we could not explain why one kind of property is compatible 
with liberty while another kind is not. There would be no real libertarian liberty; there would 
be only different forms of property. And libertarians would be deluded in thinking that 
liberty, as such, could be genuinely increased or reduced. They would really be referring to 
property that promotes rights or utility in some way, or maybe promotes something else 
entirely. But that does not seem to be correct. So it looks as though there must be a tacit 
theory of pre-propertarian liberty. And if there is such a tacit theory, then it ought to be 
possible—and should be enlightening—to make this tacit theory explicit. 
So what must libertarians be referring to by „liberty‟? What most of them explicitly 
say they mean does not withstand scrutiny, where they have any explicit theory at all. For 
instance, Robert Nozick has no explicit theory of liberty in his Anarchy, State, and Utopia. 
And some self-identified libertarians take something like Hobbesian freedom of action to be 
the libertarian sense.
5
 But this cannot be right, because that is a zero-sum view that people 
must compete over rather than one which can be either protected or increased for everyone. 
Less-confused libertarians rightly opt for something more like the Rothbardian theory of 
interpersonal liberty: of not being aggressed against by other people. But when they try to 
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make this sense explicit they run into problems. A first thing to note is that very few focus on 
liberty directly. Instead, they write about being against (initiated) coercion or aggression
6
 as 
the implied opposite of liberty, without explaining exactly how these are theoretically related 
to liberty. 
“Coercion” fails completely and obviously, if taken literally. For “coercion” is, in 
plain English, the use or threat of force against people in order to obtain their compliance. 
And thus (initiated) coercion is neither necessary nor sufficient to make an action infringe 
liberty as libertarians understand it in practice. For some liberty-flouting acts do not involve 
(initiated) force or the threat of force against people: for instance, fraud is not coercive, and 
theft is usually surreptitious rather than coercive. And some (initiated) coercion is used to 
defend against or rectify acts that flout liberty: for instance, policing and law enforcement 
insofar as they are libertarian. In recent years, however, (initiated) “coercion” has 
increasingly been dropped as the one, or main, thing that libertarians are against. 
What about “aggression”? There seems to be no similar inherent problem with saying 
that libertarians are against aggression (however, there are non-libertarian senses of 
“aggression” that must be kept distinct from the libertarian sense: such as “aggression” as the 
word is used in sport or in animal behaviour). The problem occurs when libertarians try to 
explain “aggression.” For they then typically do so in terms of acts that flout legitimate 
property rights.
7
 There are really four mistakes in one here. First, as it stands, this view is 
compatible with every system of property: they are all perceived as “legitimate” from within 
themselves. Second, to some extent it appears to be circular: to simplify somewhat, 
aggression is flouting legitimate property and legitimate property is what is acquired without 
using aggression (and throwing self-ownership, “homesteading,” “labour-mingling,” and 
“rights” into the mix does not help). Third, there is a conflation of the factual and objective 
with the moral and legal: for it ought to be possible to say what libertarian liberty is—in 
theory and practice—without at the same time insisting that it is by its very nature 
“legitimate.” Fourth, there is no independent theory of libertarian liberty from which it is 
possible to deduce what kinds of property are libertarian (whether or not they are 
“legitimate”). 
 
The solution to the crucial problem 
 
The fundamental sense of “liberty” (or “freedom”) that libertarianism implies is too abstract 
to be explained in terms of property—even self-ownership—first and foremost. That is why 
problems and paradoxes arise when this is attempted,
8
 and standard putative solutions to them 
are, albeit unwittingly, fudged rather than sound.
9
 A pre-propertarian theory of libertarian 
liberty is both possible and required. 
Liberty is always about the absence of some sort of constraint. And libertarian liberty 
is interpersonal or social: the absence of constraints initiated on people by other people. Such 
initiated constraints are, very broadly speaking, “aggressive” (rather than defensive or 
restitutive, which are thereby not initiated but reactive). It seems clearer, more neutral, and 
more precise to refer to these initiated constraints as “proactive impositions.” It also seems 
clearer to theorise the ultimate nature of those impositions as a subjective “cost” (a 
preference-utility lowering) to the victim (or recipient), in the sense of being the opposite of a 
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benefit (a preference-utility raising) and of flouting his spontaneous (or autonomous) 
preferences (not preferences he has been coerced or defrauded into having). Thus abstract 
libertarian liberty itself can be formulated as “the absence of interpersonal proactively 
imposed costs” (or, for short, “no proactive impositions”, or just “no impositions”—but the 
full formulation is always implied, of course). And where such proactively imposed costs 
clash (so that some are, in practice, unavoidable: for instance, you must suffer the noise of 
your neighbour‟s singing-practice or he must cease to practice singing at home), then the 
libertarian policy must be to minimise such costs overall.
10
 This minimisation applies to 
defence and restitution too: to go beyond what is necessary or proportionate to achieve these 
(even if the only alternative is to suffer the imposition) is to initiate a new imposed cost: e.g., 
shooting a mere trespasser or forcing him to pay extortionate compensation. And yet, all that 
said, the precise form of words is not at all what is important. What is important is the 
general idea that it must be possible to render the tacit, pre-propertarian, non-moral (or 
positive), theory of libertarian liberty explicit in some form of words. To fail to understand 
this is to lack philosophical sophistication in the same way as the failure to understand critical 
rationalism. But once this is understood, anyone can attempt a different explicit version. 
Without going into details and qualifications, this pre-propertarian and non-moral 
theory has two crucial, general, implications when it is applied to the normal human situation. 
Self-ownership is in practice entailed: for it minimises proactive impositions for people to 
exclusively control—de facto own—themselves (it is a gross proactive imposition on me—as 
a conscious being—for you to enslave me, but a relatively negligible one on you to disallow 
my enslavement by you; especially as you are thereby similarly protected). Private property is 
in practice entailed: for it minimises proactive impositions for people to have exclusive 
control over—de facto own—what resources they can acquire when they are not thereby, 
significantly, imposing on others (it is a gross proactive imposition on me for you to interfere 
with such resources as I have thus acquired, but a relatively negligible one on you to disallow 
that interference; especially as you are thereby similarly protected). That people must have 
such „property‟ (de facto exclusive resource-control) is a mere thought-experiment, logical 
implication of applying such liberty to the world as it usually is: this is to imply nothing 
about morals, rights, laws, conventions, or institutions. 
However, it is almost universal to conflate such logically entailed, de facto, „property‟ 
with morals, rights, laws, conventions, or institutions. Therefore, it might help to spell this 
out in more detail: 
1. Assume that someone has exclusive control over a resource with respect to other 
people (only he can do what he likes with it; no one else can use it without his 
consent). 
2. 1 is a form of de facto ownership or property. 
3. 1 is possible as a logical consequence of applying some rule of resource-acquisition 
(if others do or can control the resource, then the rule has not been applied and he 
does not have de facto ownership). 
4. 1 is also possible as a contingent consequence of being able to effectively defend or 
simply hide some resource. Or maybe there could be some sort of weird law of nature 
or psychology (e.g., other people find that they literally cannot control the resource 
unless he gives them permission). 
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 There are some analogies and disanalogies between this pre-propertarian theory of 
interpersonal liberty and the Coaseian theory of the reciprocal interpersonal relations that are 
intrinsic to any system of private property. But the two theories are clearly in no way 
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5. 1-4 do not involve or presuppose morals, rights, laws, conventions, or institutions. 
6. Therefore, de facto ownership can exist without presupposing morals, rights, laws, 
conventions, or institutions. 
Doubtless, some people will still insist that all „property‟ or „ownership‟ inherently involves 
morals, rights, laws, conventions, or institutions, and say that they can make no sense of „de 
facto ownership‟. For them, the implication can stop at „exclusive resource-control‟. It is 
sufficient to solve the central philosophical problem that applying this theory of liberty 
normally entails exclusive control of one‟s own body and of material things (when not 
acquired by, or causing, proactive impositions). But de facto „property‟ will be meant and 
used in what follows. 
Consequently, as a very good approximation, we can usually see what the practical 
observance of interpersonal liberty entails simply by reference to such self-ownership and 
such private property. Hence there arises both the typical libertarian correct intuition that self-
ownership and (non-imposing) private property exemplify liberty and the incorrect intuition 
that they are somehow liberty itself. However, now when philosophically challenged or when 
problem cases arise, there is an abstract theory that explains what is libertarian and why 
without falling into the sorts of errors previously explained. But this should only be done 
when necessary. The presumptions of self-ownership and (non-imposing) private property are 
practical rules that are libertarian (and analogous with the rules of rule utilitarianism). It is 
unnecessary and impractical to approach every single matter with the abstract theory alone 
(that would be analogous with a utilitarian always using only act utilitarianism). 
It is necessary to understand that this is theorising about the real nature of 
interpersonal liberty (and hence the theory is falsifiable or, at least, criticisable) as opposed to 
merely defining the word “liberty” (which would be either stipulative or a type of popular 
usage, and so unfalsifiable). Moreover, the theory is not arrived at by, nor refutable by, 
analysis of existing concepts: for current concepts are, rather, just the limited, popular ones 
that give rise to the problem. After that, it is also necessary to distinguish the different levels 
at which the theory operates, because conflating these can also lead to confusion. 1) What 
libertarian liberty as such is abstractly theorised to be. 2) What is logically entailed by 
hypothetically applying such liberty to different logically possible situations. 3) What is 
logically entailed by applying it to the normal contingent facts of the real human world. 4) 
The affirmation, explanation, or defence of the idea that the application of such liberty to the 
real world is desirable (whether practically, economically, morally, etc.). 
Does any of this really matter? Yes, it is absolutely vital. Because without some such 
theory, libertarianism at its very basis is a completely vague and ad hoc philosophical mess—
however true and important its associated economics, history, and sociology might be. Self-
identified “libertarians” cannot even explain what liberty as such is, or relate it to anything at 
all. But with this theory it is possible to have sound and precise libertarian philosophical 
answers and solutions to myriad criticisms and problems. A tacit muddle is resolved into 
explicit clarity. 
 
The social problem with the new solution 
 
This non-moral, liberty-centred, pre-propertarian theory is also combined with the critical-
rationalist method: it is held, in every part and at every stage, as a conjecture for criticism—
epistemologically unsupported and unsupportable (whether by self-ownership, rights, utility, 
eudaemonism, contractarianism, argumentation ethics, etc.) but not unexplained or 
unexplainable, or undefended or undefendable.
11
 And that combination is more than 
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sufficient to make it a radically new paradigm. Consequently, this is something that most of 
the Old Guard of libertarians are very unlikely to accept, or even to understand. Most reviews 
of L12 are clearly unwittingly baffled by what is really being said about liberty, inter alia. 
Therefore, the philosophically confused „justifications‟ (although epistemologically quite 
impossible) of „libertarianism‟ (although with no proper theory of liberty) are not likely to die 
out soon. It will be mainly a new generation of Young Turks that can understand and accept 
the new paradigm. 
With this background outline of the problem and of the offered solution, it is now 
possible to examine F13 with less chance of „not being able to see the wood for the trees‟. In 
fact, the above explanation constitutes the main reply to F13. What follows is the equivalent 
of footnotes dealing with F13‟s sundry minor confusions in detail. 
 
1. Reply to “1. Introduction” 
 
F13 often quotes misleadingly or paraphrases inaccurately. Thus it states that L12 “argues for 
what he calls „the compatibility thesis‟” (45). Thus the reader is deprived of the relevant 
information that this is intended to be a version of, “the „classical-liberal compatibility 
thesis‟, or „compatibility thesis‟ for short, though ... a more explicit and more extreme 
version” (L12, 1). The compatibility thesis is then paraphrased as, “in practice, and in the 
long term, there are no systematic clashes between interpersonal liberty, general welfare, and 
market anarchy (L12, 2)” (45). Here the reader is mainly deprived of a qualification (“rather 
than in imaginary cases”) without any indication that this has happened and left unnecessarily 
in ignorance of what was actually written. Other examples are more serious. For instance, we 
are soon told that L12 “argues ... that this conception”:  
 
(c) characterises liberty in such a way as to make the maximisation of liberty 
equivalent to the maximisation of welfare and to free-market anarchy. (45) 
 
This is particularly misleading. It makes the whole thing sound like a persuasive definition, 
which is completely mistaken. Relevant a priori and empirical connections among the 
theories of rationality (omitted by F13), liberty, welfare, and anarchy are explained. 
However, all four theories are independently defended. 
The rest of this reply will continue by dealing in detail with F13‟s interpretations and 
criticisms in the order in which they arise (points of agreement and relatively trivial 
disagreement will be ignored). It will be argued that none of them present a problem for a 
correct understanding of the theory of liberty and the compatibility thesis. 
 
2. Reply to “2. Imposed Costs” 
 
F13 quotes out of context that “costs consist of the foregone opportunities of decision-
makers” (L12, 60). The full sentence is not making that assertion about the theory of liberty 
but, rather, is about economics: 
 
Some people, particularly economists, might think that „harm‟ would be more 
accurate, and that this step is regrettable because of the difficulty in economics of 
getting people to see that costs consist of the foregone opportunities of decision-
makers. 
 
And this quoted apparent assertion 
 
“the „cost‟ I am using is an opportunity cost (so there is no inconsistency with 
economics), but it must also be imposed to be unlibertarian” (2012, 60) 
 
is only one of two given possibilities. In fact, the main idea of a „cost‟ is “a loss of what one 
wants” (as F13 quotes first), which is, more precisely and hereafter, „a preference-utility 
loss‟. 
We are then told that, “what it means for a cost to be imposed is explained in the 
following passages” (46). Six different passages are quoted and it is then concluded, 
 
Unfortunately this appears rather sloppy. Does the parenthetical “that is, without their 
consent” refer back to “initiated and imposed” or only to “imposed”?” (47) 
 
What “appears rather sloppy” is F13‟s interpretation. Even in the passages it quotes, it is 
clearly stated that we “can now define „interpersonal liberty‟ as „people not having a 
subjective cost initiated and imposed on them by other people‟.” F13 eventually realises what 
must be meant but then says, 
 
It is therefore a recipe for confusion when Lester says that “for short” liberty is the 
absence of imposed cost. (47) 
 
And yet F13 then goes on to say, 
 
However, since the weak sense of “imposed” just means without consent, we can stop 
using the term in that weak sense and talk instead of the absence of consent. So I will 
henceforth use “impose” in the strong sense, as involving an initiation as well as a 
lack of consent. (47) 
 
This is confused in two ways. First, what is imposed is not necessarily initiated just because 
there is a lack of consent: it could be a reactive imposition. Second, having criticised the 
abbreviation as “a recipe for confusion” F13 itself adopts “impose” as an abbreviation for “an 
initiation as well as a lack of consent.” That combination of complaint and usage is confused 
to the point of being a flagrant inconsistency. 
F13 also complains that “The term „initiated‟ is not defined” (47). Why would it be 
necessary to define an ordinary English word when nothing unusual is meant by the word? 
And having complained, F13 again appears to go to show that it is clear enough what is 
meant by it in context. 
Next it is asserted that, 
 
Lester adds a complication: “The ideas of cost and benefit here obviously relate to the 
person‟s unimposed desires: those not manipulated by initiating force (physical 
power) or fraud—as these are themselves imposed costs” (2012, 58). This is far from 
clear. (48) 
 
How this is “a complication” and “far from clear” is a complication and far from clear. But, 
doubtless, something could be said by way of illustration. For instance, Peter is not benefitted 
by Paul when Peter chooses to take out „insurance‟ at the point of Paul‟s gun or that Paul has 
no intention of paying out on. And Peter does not suffer an initiated (or proactively) imposed 
cost if Jack is able to prevent the chosen transaction either by, say, disarming Paul or 
stopping the relevant bank transfer although he has not yet explained the fraud to Peter. 
It is erroneously asserted that 
 the complication is intended to rule out conceptions of “positive liberty” (2012, 58), 
which may attempt to reduce costs by manipulating people‟s wants. 
 
What is actually written about this additional point is that, “This rules out, among other 
things, conceptions of „positive liberty‟ that really involve paternalism.” This is clearly an 
aside, not the main intention. Moreover, the introduction of the phrase “manipulating 
people‟s wants” overlooks and obscures the requirement that this must be by the use of 
initiated coercion or fraud. 
 F13 continues, 
 
So, it seems that what Lester means is that subjective losses or gains that depend upon 
manipulated wants are not (real) costs and benefits: to uncover the (real) costs and 
benefits, the effects of any manipulated wants have to be stripped away. (48) 
 
L12 specifically says it is referring to “force” (more precisely, „initiated coercion‟) and 
“fraud”, as we have seen was even quoted correctly by F13. The extremely misleading, and 
isolated, paraphrase “manipulated wants” is introduced by F13 (and then used repeatedly in 
that essay). 
 We are then told that “The unargued claim that manipulated wants are themselves 
imposed costs seems false.” First, what is meant by complaining about an “unargued claim”? 
Is this objecting that there are no epistemologically supporting arguments? Assuming critical 
rationalism, there can be no such thing. Let us charitably assume that what is intended is that 
the assertion is not explained and critically assessed. But, just as F13 has quoted, what was 
actually being explained was how “The ideas of cost and benefit here obviously relate to the 
person‟s unimposed desires” (and now this has been explained even further with concrete 
examples). Nowhere in L12 is anything written that implies that all “manipulated wants are 
themselves imposed costs”. This is yet another of F13‟s inaccurate paraphrases. 
Consequently, the criticism of that inaccurate paraphrase, that  
 
someone who wants his wants to be manipulated by initiating physical power, or is 
indifferent to it, does not suffer a cost by such manipulation, given Lester‟s subjective 
account of cost (48) 
 
is, in fact, entirely correct and completely in accord with all of L12. Of course want-
manipulation of any kind does not count as a proactively imposed cost if people 
spontaneously want that or are indifferent to it. 
 Given F13‟s demonstrated liability to misinterpretation, the following words are 
ominous: “It will help to clarify what Lester is saying if we try to formulate it 
systematically.” The alleged clarification begins: 
 
Since a situation of no imposed costs is a limiting case (arguably unachievable) of 
minimisation of imposed costs, we could say that liberty, on Lester‟s conception, 
means minimum imposed costs. (48) 
 
No we could not. As was explained in the introduction here, and as is clear enough in L12 
and from quotations in F13, liberty itself is only the absence of initiated (or proactively) 
imposed costs. The libertarian policy is the minimisation of any such costs. In very many 
aspects of their lives people will have perfect liberty with respect to others, and in certain 
situations people might occasionally have complete perfect liberty. Thus F13 is right to go on 
to say, 
 
However, Lester says that liberty has degrees and that an individual gains liberty as 
the costs imposed on him are reduced (2012, 59), so perhaps the most apt formula, 
which applies at both the individual and the social level, is:  
 
(L) liberty increases as imposed costs decrease. (48) 
 
Unfortunately, this is then immediately „explained‟ as 
 
Since a cost is a foregone benefit, ... 
 
No it isn‟t. There is a “non-moral and causal contrast between imposing a cost and, merely, 
withholding a benefit” (L12, 60). A cost is the opposite of a benefit: a cost is a preference-
utility loss; a benefit is a preference-utility gain. And merely to fail to provide a benefit to 
someone (say, not to give him ten pounds as a gift) is not imposing a cost on him. 
 F13 goes on to try to express everything in formalised abstract terms: 
 
(C) for any persons, x and y, y brings it about that x bears a cost at time t if and only if  
(i) the position x would have been in at time t, but for some feature of y, is wanted 
more by x than the position x is actually in at time t, 
(ii) the want mentioned in (i) is not manipulated by initiating physical power or fraud.  
 
And this might appear, at first blush, to be approximately correct. However, strictly, (ii) 
ought to read „initiating coercion or fraud‟ and, as we have seen, the relevant sense of “cost” 
is not understood in F13. Moreover, what we seem to have here, and following on for several 
similar examples, is an account redolent of the deliberately tortuous explanations of “one 
song to the tune of another” as featured on the BBC radio programme I‟m Sorry I haven‟t a 
Clue. Except that with F13, unlike in the radio programmes, the unnecessarily complicated 
explanations often even fail to capture what is required. It would be much clearer to stick to 
plain English and concrete examples, as was done in the introduction to this reply. 
 We are told that “The condition specified in (ii) is obscure in that it has not been 
explained what would constitute manipulating wants by initiating physical power or fraud.” It 
is obscure how this could seem obscure. As was explained, clear examples would be making 
you want to give me money by pointing a gun at you or by making you an apparently 
attractive but actually bogus offer. The creation and fulfilment of your want does not benefit 
you. It is an initiated imposed cost. 
 Now consider,  
 
Thus, y brings it about that x bears a cost if and only if some feature of y either 
removes a benefit from x or prevents x from having a benefit x would otherwise have 
had, provided that the relevant wants of x have not been manipulated by initiating 
physical power or fraud. (49) 
 
As costs (preference-utility losses) and benefits (preference-utility gains) are opposites, this 
is, at best, a confusing way of putting things. It would be clearer to refer simply to one person 
lowering another person‟s preference-utility relative to what it otherwise would be. Again, 
F13‟s imagined rigour is not as clear as plainer English. Furthermore, any substantive 
connection to the philosophical problem and the offered solution, as originally outlined in this 
reply, is obscure. In fact, F13 does not demonstrate any understanding of the basic problem or 
how the given solution is supposed to solve it. Instead, the essay merely unsuccessfully 
attempts to formalise the theory of liberty and then it criticises its own confused 
formalisations. 
 This continues when F13 worries at the problem of producing “a definition, or even 
part of a definition, of „initiation‟” (49). But when the theory of liberty speaks of the “absence 
of initiated imposed costs” it simply means those imposed costs that are „started‟ or „begun‟ 
or „proactive‟ as opposed to those imposed costs that are „defensive‟ or „rectificatory‟ or 
„reactive‟. And any “definition” will, in any case, lead to an infinite regress, or an arbitrary 
stopping point, or circularity. Presumably a theory of “initiation” is really what is meant. But 
no complicated theory of “initiation” itself is required in order to understand what is 
intended. Consider some more concrete and simple examples: I punch a stranger I am 
passing; or I smash the eggs that he is carrying; or I run off with his hat. A slightly different 
explanation might be required depending on whether we are looking at these events from an 
abstract pre-propertarian libertarian viewpoint or whether we are assuming that libertarian 
self-ownership and property have already been derived. However, from both viewpoints, it is 
fairly clear in what way I am initiating an imposed cost in each case. 
 It is entirely correct to say that “imposing a cost on a person is different to merely 
withholding assistance (or a benefit) from that person” (F13, 50). However, utter confusion 
then follows: 
 
withholding assistance from a person will not be a cost to that person if the person 
does not want the assistance and this want has not been manipulated. 
 
If one did not in any way cause the problem some other person has, and one has no 
contractual obligation to assist that person, then “withholding assistance” from him is 
objectively to fail to provide a positive benefit (preference-utility raising). It cannot, in itself, 
be to initiate a cost (preference-utility lowering). It is irrelevant what the person thinks about 
the failure to assist. So it is simply F13‟s muddle to assert that “from (C) and (I), withholding 
assistance is imposing a cost if the person wants assistance, ...”. 
F13 concludes the section by reiterating that 
 
None of this helps us to understand what Lester means by “initiating.” For that we 
have to rely on our ordinary understanding of the term or refer to the dictionary (“to 
begin, set going, or originate”). 
 
Yes, and that is exactly what L12 means by “initiating”. Why does F13 suggest a technical 
definition is required? Why insist on creating its own technical definitions in place of L12‟s 
plain English? Clearly, F13 is attempting to be intellectually rigorous; but it is thereby merely 
adding complexity to its own underlying misunderstandings. It would have been better to 
concentrate on understanding the problem and how the theory of liberty relates to it, and 
accurately quoting and criticising the original text. 
The reader has been spared the full quotations and analyses of “Propositions (L), (C), 
(I) and (*)” (50). But we are told that they “will be referred to repeatedly in what follows.” So 
some further replies to them will occasionally be necessary. However, this will not be done 
by following F13‟s example and trying to “formulate ... systematically” what they in their 
turn appear to be asserting while requiring and attempting technical definitions of their 
various terms. For it seems better to combat confused, abstract, complexity with plain English 
and concrete examples. 
 
3. Reply to “3.Paradoxes” 
 
“3.1 Reducing Population Increases Liberty” 
 
At the end of a paraphrased exposition concerning the possibility of “libertarian genocide” 
(but not titled as such) F13 says that, “Lester regards this as a far-fetched criticism and he 
offers a threefold, but cavalier, response” (2012, 62-63). We shall not immediately unpick 
F13‟s cavalier paraphrasing of L12‟s careful responses but go straight to F13‟s cavalier 
criticisms (which it gives in reverse order). 
 It begins: 
 
Lester‟s third point does not apply to the genocide objection, since genocide is not a 
“mere logical possibility.” (51) 
 
L12 does not say or imply that genocide as such is a mere logical possibility. It argues that 
the particular variety that is being considered is not logically implied by the given 
assumptions but, rather, logically precluded by them. 
 And then, 
 
Perhaps it is a “mere logical possibility” that we could decide to prevent all births; but 
it should not simply be dismissed. (51) 
 
It was not “simply ... dismissed.” It is shown to be not a logical possibility given the 
assumptions that were being considered. What F13 calls the “third point” was not a reference 
to the other two points as being logical possibilities, but an additional hypothetical 
consideration: “even if there were some mere logical possibility” (63). Of course, it never 
helps matters that F13 is criticising its own inaccurate paraphrases rather than quoted text. 
 F13 continues: 
 
if maximising liberty entails preventing all new births, but no one is going to consider 
seriously preventing all new births, then why should anyone consider seriously the 
aim of maximising liberty? (51) 
 
Quite. Which is exactly why more or less that question was asked—although, as usual, not in 
those exact words—and then it was explained how it doesn‟t entail that. So why does F13 ask 
the question again as though it has not been asked and answered in L12? It must be because 
of a cavalier reading. 
 We are then told that “Lester‟s second point also seems mistaken.” We can stop right 
there. F13‟s typically inaccurate paraphrase of what it calls the “second point” is that “it is 
doubtful that costs on potential people should be counted.” What is actually written in L12 is 
 
it is far from clear to me that the formula implies that we should count potential 
people.
80
 That is not how I would interpret it. But then this also applies to the original 
criticism and so undermines it. (63) 
 
In other words, to spell it out, L12 is primarily discussing what the given libertarian formula 
implies and not whether “potential people should be counted.” But L12 also explains that 
even if we accept that potential people count, then this undermines the original criticism (for 
if genocide is to be regarded as preventing even larger potential future infractions of liberty, 
then it also proactively imposes a cost that is far larger still on potential people who will not 
have lives at all—assuming that most lives are worth living, as discussed in L12 endnote 80). 
Hence it is irrelevant for F13 to argue, against its own inaccurate paraphrase, that people 
often do consider “the welfare of children they have not yet produced” and “future 
generations”, etc. 
This is the paraphrase that F13 calls the “first point”: 
 
First, if future costs imposed on potential people are to be counted, then we should 
count the countervailing, and greater, costs imposed on potential people by preventing 




Lester‟s first point may seem irrelevant, because its antecedent does not apply to the 
objection. For the objection does not, or need not, count costs imposed on merely 
potential people. The claim is simply that preventing births, or genocide, reduces 
population, thereby reducing imposed costs on currently existing people who remain 
alive. (51) 
 
No, the L12 “claim” is not “simply that preventing births, or genocide, reduces population, 
thereby reducing imposed costs on currently existing people who remain alive.” The central 
assertion in “a. Libertarian Genocide?” is stated thus: “genocide, if successful, would be a 
relatively small imposed cost compared to the costs that are bound to occur if the species 
continues indefinitely ...” (62). If F13 had only quoted what was written, then it might have 
had a criticism that aimed clearly at the target. 
F13 continues, “it seems plausible that the life of a person is, in general, a greater 
benefit to her than the costs she imposes on others.” Agreed. But then we are told “even if 
this is true, it does not help.” Help with what? F13 is not referring to things actually in L12. 
F13 purportedly explains: 
 
For if a person‟s life imposes a cost on us, that is, if it initiates a cost-bearing by us to 
which we have not consented, then killing that person, or preventing her from being 
born, is preventing her from initiating an unconsented-to cost-bearing. (51) 
 
What does “a person‟s life imposes a cost on us” amount to? Is their whole life a proactive 
imposition (i.e., aggression)? Or some one act or aspect of their life? Because of something 
they actually do or only what they would do if they were to live, or carry on living? Which is 
it? And why not give a concrete example to clarify? It might be true that “killing that person, 
or preventing her from being born” would prevent some future proactive imposition against 
us. But, first, how could we know that? And, second, we would thereby be the proactive 
imposers (or aggressors) if killing—but possibly not if it is some kind of birth-prevention (a 
concrete example really is needed)—and so liberty would seem to rule it out. So F13‟s vague 
and muddled explanation does not seem to lead to any clear criticism, paradox, or problem. 
F13 then tries to make the matter more explicit with its usual would-be rigour: 
 
by (*), if y prevents x from initiating an unconsented-to cost-bearing of y, and thereby 
brings it about that x bears a cost without consent, y is not initiating that unconsented-
to cost-bearing by x. So, by (I), y is not imposing a cost on x. Thus, taking or 
preventing the life of a person in order to prevent her from imposing costs on us 
imposes no costs on her. (51) 
 
As we have seen, all of F13‟s “systematic” analysis is an over-complicated way of expressing 
its own misunderstandings. And so any argument relying on it is irrelevant to L12. It would 
be a complicated and repetitive waste of time to unpick every example in detail. However, let 
us consider the conclusion that “taking or preventing the life of a person in order to prevent 
her from imposing costs on us imposes no costs on her.” We can ignore all of F13‟s 
confusions and interpret this as a stand-alone criticism. Other people that we will interact 
with are almost bound to proactively impose some costs on us from time to time. Does this 
mean that we are, therefore, not initiating an imposed cost on them by “taking or preventing 
the life of [such] a person”? There are several obvious things that can be said by way of a 
reply. First, „getting your retaliation in first‟ (as the old football joke has it) is precisely not to 
retaliate (hence the joke): it is ipso facto to initiate an imposed cost. Second, even if one is 
genuinely reacting to an initiated imposed cost, to do so with grossly disproportionate 
severity is to go beyond any kind of defence or rectification and (as explained in L12, 108ff, 
and L11, Ch. 27) itself to initiate a new, and more severe, imposed cost (e.g., a landowner 
cannot plausibly claim that he shot dead an inadvertent trespasser in mere reactive defence of 
his property claim). Third, by the same argument, she might take our life as a future imposer 
on her. So it is not clear how it is her, rather than us, „initiating‟ the imposition in this dubious 
and indeterminate predictive sense. F13 concludes that all this is “contra Lester, on his own 
account”. But all the accounts are inaccurate paraphrases in F13 and not the real ones in L12. 
And it is not clear that F13‟s arguments are valid even in their own terms, but that is not 
worth pursuing in detail here. 
F13 then considers the idea of “drawing the line at killing someone to prevent her 
from imposing costs on others” but asserts “there appears to be nothing in Lester‟s account 
which would explain such a limitation.” Even on F13‟s garbled account this is a perverse and 
absurd interpretation, but it is worth explaining further for clarity and emphasis. First, to kill 
someone before she is (supposedly) going to initiate an imposed cost on us is necessarily to 
initiate an imposed cost on her, and so this is ruled out. Second, to kill someone to deal with a 
relatively minor initiated imposed cost is to initiate a new and far greater imposition. It is not 
a proportional defence or rectification in order to minimise proactive impositions (this being 
the theoretically implied libertarian policy). Suppose a girl is trying to pick your pocket, so 
you cut her arm off with a swift blow of the machete you happen to be carrying. Or someone 
is trying to spy on you in your home, so you permanently blind him with an acid spray. In 
both cases you have, we may assume, prevented an initiated imposition against yourself. 
However, you have also initiated an additional imposition of your own. Disproportionately 
severe reactions are clearly not mere preventions of initiated impositions but themselves new 
initiated impositions. 
 F13 considers another possible way to rule out its imagined theoretical implication of 
killing to prevent initiated impositions: “we avoid not only the costs that the person would 
have imposed on existing people but also the benefits she would have bestowed.” And the 
correct response to this is that it isn‟t relevant. Other things being equal, the prevention of 
initiated imposed costs is silent on the issue of benefits thereby also prevented. That a thief 
benefits some people when he is not thieving, is not a relevant theoretical reason to tolerate 
his thieving. 
 F13‟s own response is that “by (C)(i), to be denied a benefit is to bear a cost” (52). 
But, as has been explained, “(C)(i)” has nothing to do with liberty as theorised in L12. In L12 
to be denied a benefit is never to have a cost initiated. F13 supposes that “by taking or 
preventing a life we bring it about that the people who remain bear a cost.” On the contrary, 
to prevent someone from benefitting others is not thereby to initiate a cost on those others. It 
might result in a loss of benefits to you if I kill your friend. But the initiated imposition is all 
on your friend (given that, as we have seen, liberty entails that he has exclusive resource-
control over his own body). It would be different with killing a pet dog that you own. But you 
cannot own your friend without initiating an imposed cost on a person. 
It has been necessary to go into some detail to demonstrate the nature and severity of 
the irrelevant confusions in this section of F13. And each slight variation of a criticism has 
been replied to, lest it be thought that it is that one that comprises a refutation. From here on, 
some of the less important paraphrasing errors and their ensuing erroneous criticisms in F13 
will sometimes be ignored. 
 
“3.2 Illiberal Measures Increase Liberty” 
 
Of the typhoid carrier, F13‟s criticism again mistakenly assumes that in L12 the costs to a 
typhoid carrier “should not count. Since ... actions taken by those people (or others) to 
prevent those costs being imposed do not impose costs ..., because they are not initiations: 
they are self-defence” (53). This error has been dealt with in principle. To go beyond what is 
necessary or reasonable in defence or rectification is to initiate a new imposition: to become 
an overall aggressor. F13 asserts that if L12 “is assuming a principle concerning minimal or 
proportional use of retaliatory force, his manoeuvre is ad hoc, because such a principle is not 
a consequence of maximising liberty as he explains it” (53). This is simply F13‟s confusion 
about the theory. The theory is explained to entail that it is possible to initiate additional 
imposed costs on others even if they started imposing first. And proactive (initiated) 
impositions must be minimised as a matter of libertarian policy. 
Of the Salman Rushdie example, F13 first says that it is “irrelevant” to expect people 
to “try to control their anger” because “we can suppose that the offended people do control 
their anger but are nevertheless still offended by what they consider to be an insult and they 
will suffer from a sense of injury or injustice until Salman is extinguished.” It is not 
“irrelevant” because it is a partial answer and is not intended to be a sufficient answer. And, 
as was also written in L12, they should also try to control their sense of being “offended”, of 
course. In a footnote F13 states “For a similar objection, and several others, to Lester‟s 
response, see Gordon and Modugno (2003, 106-7, 109).” But for detailed rebuttals to all of 
Gordon and Modugno‟s objections see Lester‟s reply (in the previous chapter), which F13 
appears to know nothing about. 
F13 notes the “rule-consequentialist” nature of L12‟s main response (which F13 calls 
the “second part”). Lest there be any confusion, it should be understood that it is rule-
consequentialist with respect to maximising liberty, and not utility. 
 A “further objection” is quoted from L12: “it must always remain possible that people 
could be more upset about something that others do purely privately than those others would 
be upset to be prevented from doing it. Without a concrete example, however, this seems a 
mere logical possibility—at least on a large scale.” And F13 asserts that this “is puzzling 
since we do appear to have concrete examples” (54): 
 
The sort of religious extremists who object to Salman do seem to be greatly upset at 
the thought of certain types of comments being made or consumed by anyone, 
whether or not they themselves happen to hear or read those comments. Many of 
these people seem so upset that they are willing to sacrifice or risk their lives to 
punish producers or consumers of those types of comment, so it is plausible that they 
are more upset by such comments being produced or consumed than the producers 
and consumers would be if they were prevented from doing so. In addition, it is quite 
possible that there are also a great number of these extremists. It appears, then, that 
Lester does not answer the objection. 
 
There are various points that can be made against this particularly lame interpretation. 1) The 
“religious extremists” are simply upsetting themselves by choosing to think about things that 
they find offensive. Therefore, that aspect is not proactively imposed. 2) To the extent that 
the alleged “types of comment” are, ex hypothesi, “purely private” how do they even know 
they exist? 3) Where are there “Many of these people” who are “willing to sacrifice or risk 
their lives to punish producers or consumers of those types of comment”? There were public 
displays of supposed anger (if they were even genuinely angry, rather than enjoying self-
perceived righteous indignation or doing it as a religious duty). That was not a sign of people 
“willing to sacrifice or risk their lives”. 4) There might be some people who would be 
“willing to sacrifice or risk their lives” to attack Rushdie, or a publishing house, etc. But they 
are relatively few and far between. And so there are not a “great number of these extremists.” 
5) The few “extremists” seem more motivated by their proactive fervour than by genuinely 
protecting themselves from being intolerably offended. 6) There are genuine proactive 
impositions that producers and consumers of such “comments” must suffer if they are 
physically attacked or coercively constrained. 7) What about the reciprocal, and escalating, 
upset at the Muslim behaviour, etc., that such a suppression of private communications would 
cause? 8) This cannot plausibly be universalised into a rule that would prevent more 
proactive imposing than it allows. Therefore, F13‟s view that the coercive suppression of 
such purely private communications is a lesser proactive imposition that tolerating them is 
not at all realistic. (It is no more realistic than the view that many people are so unavoidably 
and intensely offended by the thought that homosexual behaviour is occurring in private that 
it is a lesser proactive imposition to suppress such private acts.) Hence, we can ignore F13‟s 
further discussion of the—in any case, implausible—possibility that such wants “have been 
manipulated by a combination of threats and frauds perpetrated by influential or powerful 
religious leaders.” 
F13 then, as usual, inaccurately paraphrases the discussion about the possibility of, 
what L12 calls, “Libertarian Utility Monsters.” And it is possible, as usual, to more than 
reciprocate F13‟s view that the “response to this example seems particularly unsatisfactory.” 
First, contra F13, it is clearly relevant to the possibility of such monsters that there is no 
incentive for them to exist, because only if they did might they pose a real problem for the 
theory of liberty (the theory of liberty is not supposed to be adequate in all logically possible 
cases). But even given that they do exist, then it is not true that, as F13 baldly states, 
“maximising liberty requires illiberal restraints” (55). And this is precisely because of the 
long-term consequences of giving in to them, as L12 explains and F13 even quotes: “a 
society of passionate brutes demanding great compensation or blocking normal activities 
would undermine the efficient, long term minimising of imposed costs (or why have we not 
evolved to be more passionate?)” Although F13 fails to add L12‟s conclusion that, “So to 
avoid their multiplication is a sound libertarian reason not to give way to such people to the 
extent that they exist” (69). And yet F13 says this “seems blatantly incorrect” because 
 
The point of the objection is precisely that prohibiting normal activities for the sake of 
Monster‟s sensitivities is an efficient way of minimising imposed costs and, 
presumably, will be so for the long term, unless someone can explain why it is not. 
(55) 
 
So F13 simply fails to realise that the explanation is an explanation. It is possible to elaborate, 
of course. The consequences of always giving in to the extremely passionate are bound to 
produce more such people. There would be an „arms race‟ of cultivated (and possibly even 
evolutionarily-selected) intemperance. The world would have ever more utility monsters. 
Instead of peaceful cooperation, people would try to proactively impose their preferences on 
others by developing an uncontrollable frustration at not getting what they want. It would be 
a world where people are increasingly either allowed to proactive impose on others in order 
to prevent their own uncontrollably great frustration, or suffering a proactive imposition 
because they are not, yet, sufficiently uncontrollably passionate. There would be more 
proactive impositions all round in such an intemperate world. Hence, we should not give in to 
utility monsters. 
F13 then states that “What might be an attempt by Lester to give such an explanation 
(2012, 160-61) is not at all clear” (55). But then very little is clear to F13, and this is mainly 
because it does not grasp the basic problem with libertarian liberty or how the suggested 
theory of liberty is supposed to solve it. In any case, F13 does not even attempt to fault the 
explanation or explain what it finds unclear. 
F13 paraphrastically observes that L12 “claims ... that, if it turns out that there really 
are people like Monster, we might wish to opt for a different conception of liberty (2012, note 
86, 213)” and then absurdly supposes that this “is just to concede the objection!” (55) First, 
the word “might” (which is in L12 as well) is not the word “would.” But the real problem is 
that F13 has not understood that the purpose of the abstract theory of liberty is to be 
practically adequate for libertarianism in the real world, not in every logically possible 
circumstance. 
This error is repeated when F13 paraphrases L12 as holding that “Monster is only a 
logical possibility which can be ignored for purposes of his practical compatibility thesis” 
(55). For it states that 
 
this cavalier treatment of logical possibilities seems to impugn Lester‟s seriousness in 
giving a philosophically satisfactory account of liberty. A logically possible counter-
example signifies a problem that may imply further logically possible counter-
examples, some of which may be actual: it should prompt further investigation and 
testing of one‟s thesis rather than being simply dismissed. (55) 
 
F13 simply does not understand what is going on because of its cavalier reading of L12. It 
does not even understand the problem with liberty that the theory is trying to solve. L12 is 
scrupulous about considering logical possibilities that are relevant to the adequacy of the 
theory of libertarian liberty in the real world and to the classical liberal compatibility thesis. 
There is no attempt to give a “philosophically satisfactory account of liberty” simpliciter, or 
in any other sense, or outside these constraints. Hence a “logically possible counter-example” 
that is not within the limits of the project will not be one that “signifies a problem that may 
imply further logically possible counter-examples.” They are irrelevant to “further 
investigation and testing of one‟s thesis” and should be “simply dismissed”—at least, after 
they have been shown to be irrelevant if they are raised. F13‟s general approach to logical 
possibility is like that of a schoolboy who has just grasped the idea and cannot stop applying 
it promiscuously and irrelevantly. 
 In summary of this section (but this also applies generally), F13 fails to produce a 
single criticism of the slightest cogency or, usually, even relevance. This is due to several 
main factors. 1) It does not even grasp the main philosophical problem with libertarian 
liberty. 2) Therefore, it cannot grasp how the solution relates to that problem. 3) It 
paraphrases with extreme inaccuracy (instead of quoting) or quotes out of context and then 
criticises its own misrepresentations. 4) It interprets the text in a cavalier and hubristic 
manner. 5) It is uninformed by much of the relevant literature on “Lester‟s Account of 
Liberty”: both the further essays and the replies to all the critical reviews. 
 
4. Reply to “4. Property” 
 F13 asserts that “property is a social relation involving rights and obligations, and so any 
derivation of property rules must be talking about rights and morals” (56). This thereby 
simply ignores, without offering any direct criticism, L12‟s de facto account of „property‟ in 
the sense of the „exclusive control of resources‟ that the application of a rule to, real or 
imagined, circumstances can logically entail. There is no need for “talking about rights and 
morals.” Ironically, “this cavalier treatment of logical possibilities seems to impugn [F13]‟s 
seriousness in giving a philosophically satisfactory account of [libertarian property]” (or it 
fails to understand logical possibility in this case, at least). F13 states that L12 “does not 
assume the correctness of any theory of rights or morals”. But L12 goes much further than 
that here: it does not even assume their existence. F13 then suggests that “if maximising 
liberty is good or right, then, ceteris paribus, the property rights he has derived will be at least 
part of the correct theory of rights and morals.” This is dragging “rights and morals” back in 
when the whole point of L12 is to show what the existence of liberty objectively entails 
irrespective of whether rights and morals even exist. 
 F13‟s confusion continues as it claims that L12‟s “arguments seem to be guided by 
familiar libertarian assumptions about morality and private property, which he is unable to 
truly set aside” (56). On the contrary, that is exactly F13‟s problem. As a putative illustration 
contra L12, F13 asserts that giving someone impure water by mistake, after they request 
water, is an initiated imposition: “Since you have not consented to bear a cost that I initiated, 
I have imposed the cost on you, according to (I)” (56). But to give someone what they request 
is precisely not to initiate a cost, because they initiated it by requesting it. Again, F13 is lost 
in a sea of words because it does not understand either the problem or the theory. Contra F13, 
morals are irrelevant here. 
 F13 goes on to observe that L12 says that (in F13‟s paraphrase) “significant 
negligence may have made my action an imposition” (57). And F13 irrelevantly asserts that 
“Significant negligence, of course, may make an unintentional action blameworthy” (57). 
This is another complete misunderstanding by F13. If my behaviour negligently imposes on 
you, then that is an objective proactive imposition on you. It is an entirely separate matter 
whether that objective proactive imposition is morally blameworthy (and, logically, it might 
or might not be). A useful tool of philosophy is separating matters that are often conflated in 
a confusing way by common sense. F13 here sticks to a common-sense conflation in the face 
of a clear philosophical distinction without offering any critical argument. It is simply fatuous 
of F13 to assert that L12 “seems to be guided, not by his own theory of imposed costs, but by 
our ordinary conception of what is morally blameworthy.” (See L12 109, i. „Torts‟ and 
„Crimes‟.) 
F13 is hubristic despite its—here demonstrated—misunderstanding of every aspect of 
L12 that it criticises. It is not merely ultimately erroneous; it is fundamentally confused. And 
it is this confusion that causes F13 to conclude that “throughout Escape from Leviathan, it is 
familiar libertarian assumptions about property rights and morals which seem to more or less 
license the steps Lester takes” (57). As F13 simply does not understand the theory, or even 
the problem to which it is the solution, it is in no position to determine that the “theory about 
minimising imposed costs is retained only in words.” F13‟s conclusion that the “derivations 
seem hopeless” is true of its own paraphrased versions of the derivations, but these do not 
relate to any real understanding of L12. 
We are then informed that L12‟s  
 
premises often conflict with his conception of liberty and his inferences are often 
invalid. In order to avoid repetition, I will show this only for his attempted derivations 
of self-ownership and homesteading. (57) 
 As F13 demonstrably does not understand the theory of liberty, this does not seem very 
likely. But let us see. 
 
“4 .1 Self-Ownership” 
 
Self-ownership can be more clearly, simply, and precisely derived from observing liberty 
than is done in L12. There is an example at the beginning of this essay and there have been 
others by Lester in other places (some are now reproduced in other chapters of this book, 
including one, five, and six). F13 might profitably have examined some of these were its 
bibliography for “Lester‟s Account of Liberty” wider than only L12. That said, the L12 
version will be defended here. 
F13 states that L12‟s “derivation of self-ownership from the observance of liberty is 
set out in the following passage” (57). F13 then quotes one paragraph: 
 
We have both been washed ashore on an unowned island of frugal resources. I assume 
that nothing is yet owned, including ourselves. I then assume that liberty is to be 
observed ...  
 
For some reason the explanatory “(that is, not infringed)” is omitted. F13 then quotes the 
succeeding paragraph but with its own numbers inserted: 
 
Now, [1] to withhold a benefit, or good, to which one has given rise—without thereby 
imposing on others or agreeing to give it to them—makes others no worse off. [2] It 
cannot therefore impose a cost (except in the insignificant, and reciprocal, sense of 
using any resources that another person might otherwise have used). And [3] the 
benefit, or good, that one first and most directly gives rise to, merely by existing, is 
one‟s own body. So [4] to decline to allow that body to be used by others is merely to 
withhold a benefit. By contrast, [5] to use another‟s body against his wishes clearly 
imposes a cost on him. Therefore, [6] the control of one‟s body (self-ownership) 
immediately follows if liberty is to be observed. (2012. 76)  
 
We might now expect a direct criticism of that brief explanation of how self-ownership arises 
from observing liberty. And such a criticism could be useful. But instead of that, F13 mainly 
discusses its own example concerning the external property of a “tree-house” that “Alice” 
builds and denies to “Bob”. Exactly how that is supposed to relate to self-ownership is 
problematic in itself. But it is all the more so because it is also based on a complete 
misunderstanding. It will be convenient to quote and examine the most relevantly confused 
parts. 
F13 states that “Alice brings it about that Bob bears a cost, by withholding the tree-
house from him” (58). However, being kept out of the tree-house is not a, significant, 
initiated imposed cost, because Bob is not, significantly, worse off because there now exists a 
tree-house that he cannot use. There is, at most, some minor utility-lowering if Bob cannot 
now use the same natural resources, or is unavoidably envious or frustrated that he cannot 
just use the new tree-house. But there would be a significant initiated imposed cost on Alice 
if, against her wishes, Bob were to use the tree-house that she had invested her thought, time, 
and labour in creating. Therefore, if liberty is to be maximised, then the minimising of 
imposed costs entails that Alice must have exclusive control of the resource that is the tree-
house. And to have exclusive control of it is to de facto own it. Morals, or rights, or laws, or 
social conventions are not entailed, or presupposed. (But, as said at the start, if one thinks that 
ownership must involve these things, then we can stop at „exclusive control of the resource‟ 
being entailed: for that is sufficient to solve the central philosophical problem.) 
 Consequently, F13 is right to observe the possibility that what Alice also “initiated 
without his consent is the cost constituted by his unsatisfied want to take over the tree-house” 
(58). But we have now dealt with that in F13‟s example. The problem is that F13 is looking 
only at Bob‟s side of the story and ignoring the fact that any giving-in to Bob will initiate a 
much greater cost on Alice, and that initiated imposed costs need to be minimised if liberty is 
to be maximised. As ever, F13 discusses the mere words without any understanding of the 
philosophical problem of how libertarian liberty relates to „property‟, and that some pre-
propertarian form of words must be possible if not exactly the ones used in L12. With these 
additional and more detailed responses to F13‟s invented example, at least, we can see in 
what relevant ways F13 is confused to confidently draw as an inference that “Sentence [2], 
then, is false, given Lester‟s theory of imposed costs” and so “sentence [1] is also false” 
(admittedly, with the benefit of hindsight, those two sentences could have been elaborated in 
more nuanced and convincing ways; but a new theory—as this theory of liberty was, and to a 
considerable extent still is—is more about groping for the truth rather than clarifying what is 
already fairly well understood). 
 F13 then discusses sentence [1]‟s phrase “without thereby imposing on others.” It first 
suggests that this might mean “without imposing a cost on others.” It does. But F13 rejects 
this because L12 “wants to derive as a conclusion in [2] that no cost is imposed, so to include 
this in [1] would make his argument blatantly circular” (58). All valid arguments are circular: 
there can be nothing in the conclusions that is not implicit in the premises. So F13 is, in 
effect, complaining that the argument is valid. (And if it is “blatant” rather than „flagrant‟ 
then that might be when it is read aloud.) In any case, says F13, “to create and withhold a 
benefit from someone is to impose a cost on him, if he has not consented to have the benefit 
withheld and if you initiated the creation and withholding” (58-59). But we have dealt with 
that criticism as it applies to F13‟s example. F13 suggests, instead, that what L12 “means by 
„without thereby imposing on others‟ in [1] is „without using physical force against others‟.” 
However, such a suggestion could only be made by completely failing to understand the 
philosophical problem, and how the pre-propertarian theory relates to it, and by falling back 
on the normal libertarian confusion over liberty and force. As usual, F13‟s “arguments seem 
to be guided by familiar libertarian assumptions about morality and private property, which 
he is unable to truly set aside” (56). 
 F13 asks “How might Lester respond?” At first it considers that “Bob‟s current 
position is no worse in purely material terms”. F13 correctly rejects this, but for muddled 
reasons that are not worth examining. F13 also considers the possibility that “Bob‟s 
unsatisfied want of the tree-house does not count as a cost because it is a manipulated want.” 
And F13 correctly rejects this, but again for muddled reasons that are not worth examining.  
 F13 then states that “Sentence [3] also seems to be incorrect” because 
 
There is no ordinary sense in which I give rise to my body or to the benefit or good 
which is my body, let alone doing so merely by existing. (59) 
 
This is to misunderstand a simple point. If we assume that some human being exists, then this 
thereby entails that he has—because in some sense he is—a human body of some kind. So 
assuming the existence of a human entails (or “gives rise to”) that human‟s body; and that 
body is usually a good thing from that human‟s viewpoint. That is all that is meant. However, 
we do only continue to exist because we maintain ourselves adequately: and so also in that 
“ordinary sense” our bodies are continuing goods that each of us “gives rise to”. In any case, 
why would a philosophical text use what is an “ordinary sense” as the sole criterion of truth 
or validity in a philosophical argument? 
 F13 continues, 
 
It seems rather to be the case that my body gives rise to me, since consciousness 
appears to be an emergent property of certain types of physical organism. (59) 
 
L12 implicitly assumes that humans are biological beings that usually have personhood in the 
intellectual sense (at least, once sufficiently mature). F13 is drawing attention to the fact that 
the existence of a person in the intellectual sense is “an emergent property.” However, that 
does not mean that human persons are not biological beings. In any case, it does not fault 
L12‟s explanation of how liberty relates to self-ownership.  
 F13 then makes the same point about withholding a wanted benefit, but relative to 
one‟s body: 
 
Bob may have an acute want to make use of Alice‟s body. ... So ... Alice brings it 
about that Bob bears a cost ... that Bob has not consented to bear ... [because] she did 
initiate the cost-bearing by withholding from Bob the use of her body ... (59) 
 
Strictly speaking, this is correct. And had L12 been more elaborate and qualified at that point, 
then this matter might have been dealt with in the manner explained at the start of this essay 
and immediately above with respect to the tree-house (as F13 itself might have seen if it 
included more of the recent relevant literature on “Lester‟s account of liberty”). Put simply, it 
minimises proactively imposed costs for people to have exclusive control over their own 
bodies. Alice might initiate an imposed cost on Bob in the way explained. But Bob would 
initiate a far greater cost on Alice if he were to use her body without her permission. The 
lesser imposition is more libertarian. And because of the reciprocal nature of the matter (for 
example, Alice might suffer some disutility that she cannot enslave or kill Bob, etc.) no 
compensation is plausibly due. 
 F13‟s suggestion is that we “would avoid this conclusion ... if Alice had refused Bob 
permission to use her body in response to some feature of Bob that either imposed a cost on 
her or threatened to do so” (59-60). There are at least three mistakes here. First, F13 
overlooks that a clash of initiated imposed costs is possible. Second, F13 overlooks that 
imposed costs should be minimised when there is such a clash. Third, presumably Alice has 
implicitly “refused Bob permission to use her body in response to some feature of Bob that 
either imposed a cost on her or threatened to do so”: that “feature” being just such use of her 
body, or threat thereof. F13 states that there is “nothing in the description of the situation that 
implies this” rejection. But it is unrealistic to think that a rejection needs to be explicit. In any 
case, this is all an irrelevant confusion. The main criticism has been fully answered. 
F13 then criticises “sentence [5]”, which is L12‟s assertion that “to use another‟s body 
against his wishes clearly imposes a cost on him.” For, says F13, “using someone‟s body 
against his wishes does not impose a cost on him if it is done in self-defence or to exact 
redress for a cost he imposed” (60). If we wanted to interpret F13 with equal literalness, then 
we might reply that this is clearly wrong because it necessarily does impose—but it does not 
initiate the imposition. However, F13 clearly intends to refer to initiated impositions. And so 
it is more or less right: it does not initiate an imposed cost (unless, as we have seen, it is 
excessive). How both self-defence and redress fit in with the theory of liberty are explained 
later in L12. Given the context of L12‟s assertion, it ought to be clear that we are assuming a 
neutral starting point where nothing is owned and human interactions have yet to start. So 
F13 is mistaken to suggest that L12 has merely overlooked such a possibility. 
F13 concludes that “[6], seems plainly false” (60). L12‟s “[6]” is that “the control of 
one‟s body (self-ownership) immediately follows if liberty is to be observed.” However, 
F13‟s conclusion is on the basis of the criticisms that have already been fully rebutted here. 
Not understanding the depth of the hole F13 is in, digging continues in earnest. For it 
is now asserted that, “liberty, on Lester‟s account, seems to endorse rape as a way of reducing 
imposed costs, since it would remove the cost Alice imposed on Bob without imposing a cost 
on Alice” (60). But this, yet again, ignores clashes of proactively imposed costs, and that 
proactively imposed costs need to be minimised, and that excessive reactions can themselves 
proactively impose. 
However, F13 then argues that 
 
it may still be that the cost Bob imposes on Alice by raping her is smaller than the 
cost Alice imposes on Bob by denying him the use of her body. (60) 
 
This is F13‟s usual resort to mere logical possibility. For it is completely unrealistic to 
suppose that a normal woman would be less imposed on by a rape than a normal man would 
be imposed on by being denied sexual intercourse with her. For one thing, the man does not 
even need to look at or think about the woman. To the extent that he chooses to do so, it 
seems that any relatively slight frustration is self-inflicted. By contrast, a woman that is being 
raped can hardly ignore the awfulness of it or, even if she were unconscious at the time, stop 
strongly disvaluing that it happened. Some very abnormal people exist, of course, but the 
point is to come up with practical interpretations that can be universalised as libertarian rules. 
F13‟s criticism is analogous with a statist who points out that the view of property that 
libertarians defend is logically compatible with destitution, starvation, etc. Yes, it is. But that 
logical possibility is not realistic as a criticism of libertarian property as such (or so a 
libertarian would usually argue). A statist version of F13 might still reply that “This cavalier 
treatment of logical possibilities seems to impugn [libertarians‟] seriousness in giving a 
philosophically satisfactory account of [property].” And, again, the correct response to this is 
that any realistic and relevant criticisms need to be answered, but otherwise we should not get 
carried away with mere logical possibilities. 
However, F13 remains resolutely unrealistic with respect to rape. For it then says that, 
 
Even if it could be shown that overall imposed costs would be reduced if there were a 
rule either permitting or prohibiting rape, the question of which of these rules would 
involve lower imposed costs has not been answered. (60) 
 
It was not answered at that point in L12, because it was not being asked. As F13 has raised 
the question, it has now been answered. Is F13 seriously unsure which rule would “involve 
lower imposed costs”? Being raped is generally a terrible thing for almost anyone. Not being 
able to rape at will is mainly a self-inflicted and relatively small frustration for a tiny minority 
of men. Another response might be to adapt John Rawls‟s Original Position: assuming 
egoism and that you have amnesia about who you are and what your tastes are, which rule 
would you choose in order to minimise your chances of suffering proactively imposed costs? 
Clearly, it is the prohibition of rape. However, the point here is so strong that there is no need 
to resort to the Original Position: given whom you actually are, which rule would you choose 
in order to minimise your chances of suffering proactively imposed costs? Only a tiny 
minority of psychopathic men might opt for permitting rape. Consequently, F13‟s question 
appears to be of doubtful seriousness, but the right answer does not appear to be in serious 
doubt. 
 F13 goes on to suggest that, 
 the argument can be generalised. Indeed, since we all impose some costs on others by 
denying them the use of our bodies, it seems that liberty, on Lester‟s conception, 
leaves us all exposed to infringements of self-ownership. (60) 
 
And the reply to F13‟s argument can be generalised as well. F13 has only logical possibility 
on its side. Realistically, since we would all find it less of an overall imposed cost to observe 
self-ownership it seems that this theory leaves none of us “exposed to infringements of self-
ownership.” F13 does not understand the philosophical problem with how libertarian liberty 
relates to all ownership, including self-ownership, and so how a pre-propertarian theory is 
necessary to solve that. Hence, F13 is reduced to floundering around in a context-free 
confusion in which its examination of mere words and logical possibilities is bound to be 
hopelessly irrelevant. 
 As has been shown, F13 does not have even one sound criticism of L12‟s “derivation 
of self-ownership from the observance of liberty” (60). Moreover, it misunderstands almost 
everything at almost every point, while being completely unrealistic in its own views. As 
ever, the underlying problem with F13 is that—like all of the Old Guard libertarian 
literature—it simply doesn‟t understand the philosophical problem. 
 F13 has not yet stopped digging. Having raised the issue of rape, it quotes a later 
passage in L12 on the subject: 
 
Assume that no valid property claims yet exist, even in one‟s own person. A man tries 
to rape a woman. That woman‟s interests would thereby be objectively sacrificed to 
the man‟s interests. If the woman tries to prevent the rape by, say, running away then 
she is objectively merely protecting herself, the body that she is, and not thereby 
sacrificing, or imposing on, the would-be rapist in any way. Merely to withhold a 
benefit one gives rise to—in this case the use of the body that one sustains—is not to 
impose a cost or sacrifice on anyone else. (2012, 166-67) 
 
This very brief passage is, of course, hardly intended to be an exhaustive examination of the 
matter. F13 states that this “passage does not make much sense in light of Lester‟s theory.” 
As has been shown, F13 has offered no sound criticism to that effect. F13 goes on to assert 
that, 
 
the statements are true if we reinterpret them according to a moral theory in which 
people are normally entitled to exclude other people from making use of their bodies 
without consent (61) 
 
A first thing to notice here, is that if a “moral theory” can make the statements “true”, then 
this seems to imply that moral theories can be true and that we have the true one. It is very 
odd to have those controversial philosophical implications as presuppositions that require no 
further explanation or defence. But even if F13 is right, it is irrelevant to criticising the 
passage. 
F13 goes on to irrelevantly “reinterpret” three statements: “the woman‟s interests 
would be objectively sacrificed to the man‟s” becomes “the woman‟s right would be 
violated”; “she is merely protecting herself, not imposing on the would-be rapist” becomes 
“she is merely defending her right without violating the rights of the would-be rapist”; 
“merely to withhold a benefit is not to impose a cost” becomes “refusing the man permission 
to use her body does not violate his rights” (61). However, this way to “reinterpret” the 
statements simply ignores the theory of liberty and the problem that it is trying to solve and, 
instead, reinserts the same problematic libertarian moral position without any explanation of 
how it relates to liberty. This is analogous with having an explanation of falsificationism that 
a critic chooses to “reinterpret” into an account of how induction is supposed to work. The 
confusion and irony could hardly be more acute. 
Therefore, it is true, but completely misses the point, that “In our ordinary moral 
view, the woman‟s „interests‟ trump the man‟s because she has a right to exclude him from 
using her body”. And it is false, and completely misses the point, that in L12‟s “conception of 




L12 discusses “initial acquisition” (124-127), preferring it as a clearer expression than 
“homesteading” (73). As usual, F13 reverts to the old way of writing and understanding 
libertarian matters and uses “homesteading.” F13 first states that L12 “argues for a Lockean 
principle that people are entitled to take possession of unowned resources provided they leave 
enough and as good for others (2012, note 94, 213).” No, it is not that L12 “argues for a 
Lockean principle”; rather it explains how the non-moral content of that principle is 
compatible with the theory of liberty. And L12 certainly does not mention what people are 
“entitled” to. Having a non-normative theory of interpersonal liberty that does not mention 
morals, or rights, etc., is the whole point. 
 F13 then asserts that L12 “once again ... departs from [its] own conception of liberty.” 
And it quotes this as an example in L12: 
 
There is only one natural water supply on the island… Suppose, instead of being 
already available, the water had been produced by the digging of a well. Then 
whoever created the well could find the use of it without his permission to be a cost to 
him. He was not thereby causing a cost to anyone else, provided that the other person 
had other places where he could dig a well at least as easily. (2012, 76-77)  
 
F13 objects that on F12‟s  
 
account of liberty, the truth of the final sentence depends upon what the other person 
wants. Creating the well does impose a cost on the other person if that person does not 
want a well there, perhaps because it spoils the view, perhaps because he now has to 
walk around it on one of his usual perambulations, or for any number of other 
possible reasons. (62) 
 
There are, indeed, an indefinitely large number of either trivial or unlikely possibilities, any 
of which might be mentioned here—but all of which could not possibly be mentioned. L12 is 
simplifying matters in order to get at the general way in which initial acquisition is entailed 
by minimising initiated imposed costs. And it might have been clearer to have explicitly 
recognised and stated that this was being done. In any case, simplifying matters seems to be a 
valid procedure, and one that is also followed when theorising in many of the sciences and 
social sciences. But F13 is also forgetting or unaware of the necessity of minimising clashes 
of proactively imposed costs. Consider the two clashing options: 1) banning one person‟s 
much-needed well, and 2) having the other person put up with resenting the well “perhaps 
because it spoils the view, perhaps because he now has to walk around it on one of his usual 
perambulations, or for any number of other possible reasons.” As long as those “other 
possible reasons” are, in fact, just as relatively trivial, then clearly 2 is to be entailed as the 
lesser of the two proactive impositions. Therefore, there is no inherent problem for the 
derivation of initial acquisition here. There is no “departure from [L12‟s] own theory”.  
 F13 alleges another “departure” is to be found “in the following passage, in which he 
contradicts himself (with numbered sentences for ease of reference)”: 
 
So, [1] to the extent that I exclusively possess an essential natural resource which you 
would otherwise have found and had the use of, I am imposing a cost on you ([2] you 
are worse off than you would have been thanks to me alone, and you did not agree to 
the change); that is, [3] [I am] curtailing your liberty. But [4] when other wells are 
equally possible (not harder to locate or inconveniently situated, and so on) then even 
if you lack the wit or the strength to dig your own well, you would be lessening my 
liberty (imposing a cost on me) if you were, against my wishes, to use the well I have 
dug. [5] I do not impose a cost on you by merely creating the well and denying you 
access. Therefore [6] I have not lessened your liberty and I can libertarianly control, 
or own, the well. (2012, 77-78)  
 
F13 says that “[4] seems false, given (*)”. And the explanation that is then given is that: 
 
Since I have imposed a cost on you, you may be obtaining redress rather than 
imposing a cost on me by using the well against my wishes. (62) 
 
What cost has been imposed? F13 does not clearly say. It has mentioned “(*)” but we have 
seen that those various formal interpretations of the parts of the theory of liberty are 
hopelessly confused, and so that does not help much. Does it mean the possible monopoly 
cost in [1]? But [4] assumes that [1] is not the case: i.e., the “But” at the start of [4]. So that 
cannot be correct. Does it mean the trivial frustration at not being able to use exactly the same 
natural resources when there is no shortage of such resources? Or does it mean the frustration 
at not having access to the new well? But the minimisation of clashing proactively imposed 
costs deals with both of those. In any case, as we have also seen, “redress” needs to be 
proportional if it is not itself to proactively impose. And the permanent use of another 
person‟s created economic good does not look proportional to a very slight utility loss. As 
ever, F13 is trying to be argumentatively rigorous. But such rigour is completely impossible 
when there is no proper understanding of the philosophical problem or of the putative 
solution. 
 F13 continues in its delusions of rigour when it asserts that “Sentence [5] explicitly 
contradicts sentences [1], [2], and [3]” (62). But sentences [1], [2], and [3] relate to a 
completely different situation in which “I exclusively possess an essential natural resource 
which you would otherwise have found and had the use of.” Sentence [5] relates to 
assumption [4], “But when other wells are equally possible (not harder to locate or 
inconveniently situated, and so on)”. These are two different situations that F13 is mistaking 
for one. So it is not true that L12 “has to abandon his account of liberty, which gives him [1] 
through [3], and introduce a postulate, [5], which is inconsistent with it” (62). Sentence [5] is 
not a “postulate” but follows from [4], given the implicit simplifying assumptions that have 
been discussed here. And F13 itself admits that “The conclusion, [6], follows from [5]” (62). 
It adds the logical point that “it also, trivially, follows from the full set of premises, [1] 
through [5], because their conjunction is a contradiction” (62). For a contradiction entails 
anything and everything. But it is only F13 that is assuming that the two different and 
inconsistent situations are intended to be one and the same. 
 F13 concludes that 
 
Lester jettisons his account of liberty when it provides the opposite of the conclusion 
he wants to reach ... What lies behind [5] seems to be the moral theory that I have a 
right to the exclusive control of what I create. ... the real work of deriving a system of 
property rights is done by a theory of property rights which is tacitly or 
subconsciously assumed even though it contradicts his account of liberty. (63) 
 
As we have seen, only F13‟s confusion could allow it to reach this conclusion. As it does not 
grasp what is going on, it falls back on accusing L12 of “tacitly or subconsciously” assuming 
the orthodoxy that it prefers. But that orthodoxy is the problem: tendentiously moralised 
property rights that have no explicit theoretical connection to a non-normative account of 
liberty. 
 
5. Reply to “5. Welfare and Free Markets” 
 
F13 asserts that it will now “show that liberty, qua (L), is inconsistent with free markets.” 
F13 begins: 
 
An entrepreneur who brings a new product to market creates in many people an 
unsatisfied want for that product. Since he does not give the product, as a gift, to the 
people who want it, he imposes a cost on them, either because they have to pay his 
price, and can thus avoid the cost he imposes on them only by bearing another cost 
(by giving up something they want), or because they cannot afford his price, and thus 
continue to have their want for his product unsatisfied. (63-64) 
 
Realistically, it is hard to see how producing a new product thereby proactively imposes on 
(i.e., initiates a utility-lowering of) most of the people who want it. In fact, most people 
experience a modest rise in utility (a benefit) merely at discovering the opportunity of a new 
valued product. If they were genuinely made worse off by knowing about its mere existence, 
then they ought to prefer that the product—which, ex hypothesi, they want—does not, or did 
not ever, exist or that they did not know about it. But few people feel this way. Most people 
don‟t usually even feel this way about desired products that they think they will never be able 
to afford: luxury goods well beyond their means. Moreover, as ever, F13 is also overlooking 
the minimising of clashes in proactively imposed costs. For even when there is some 
lowering of utility here, the libertarian policy of minimising proactively imposed costs entails 
that such things must be allowed: or we should all suffer the much more severe proactively 
imposed costs of never having valuable new products made available and of never making a 
living by providing them. An odd phenomenon here, is that F13‟s argument appears to have 
something of the flavour of the socialist criticism of “false needs”: the fulfilment of which 
supposedly does not really make the consumer any better off. But, as we have seen (in brief 
outline, at least), one can undermine such a criticism on its own welfare grounds without 
needing to resort to a much more complicated, controversial, and weaker argument based on 
“a theory of property rights.” 
 F13 continues: 
 
The entrepreneur will also impose a cost on producers of rival products, since he will 
reduce demand for their products and thus reduce their income, which they do not 
want. (64) 
 
As explained in the introduction, there are two main ways of applying the theory of liberty. 
One is to derive self-ownership and (initiated-imposition-minimising) private property 
generally, and then to use these as libertarian rules, which give us the sorts of property that 
libertarians accept. Such property rules approximate closely to what the abstract theory 
implies rather as classical mechanics approximates closely to relativity theory for most 
human-scale purposes. But when clear problem cases arise, then we have to resort to the 
more precise abstract theory. The other way of applying the theory of liberty is to assume 
away any ownership and apply the pure theory directly to whatever the situation is (but 
bearing in mind that we want to find practical rules and not impractical chaos). 
If we take the first approach to rival producers, then the answer is that there is no 
infraction of liberty because no producer owns his customers‟ continuing custom. Within the 
derived framework of self-ownership and private property, continuing custom is a benefit. 
And to lose a benefit is not to be proactively imposed on. If we take the second, pure pre-
propertarian, approach to rival producers, then we are a proactively imposed cost to any 
rival—and vice versa (as F13 overlooks or does not understand). And to deny the potential 
consumers the possibility of choosing the new product would be to proactively impose on 
them. But so would not allowing them to seize the product without payment. And so would 
allowing the producer to have his product seized without payment. For in the completely 
abstract pre-propertarian situation we have indefinitely many potential clashes of proactively 
imposed costs. So what is the best way to minimise them, and thus maximise liberty? It is 
simply to observe self-ownership, private property, contracts, etc., as libertarian rules—
unless and until a clear problem arises as regards minimising imposed costs. And there is no 
such problem with allowing rival producers to compete in the market place. Rather, that is the 
solution to the general problem. 
It might be suggested that a pre-propertarian libertarian cannot validly use the, ex 
hypothesi, imperfect rules of self-ownership and (initiated-imposition-minimising) private 
property. But the abstract theory does explain why those rules are very good approximations 
to what liberty requires. And the propertarian theorist has no explicit and adequate theory of 
liberty at all. So that is somewhat like saying that a relativity theorist is inconsistent to ever 
use classical mechanics in his calculations. For, similarly, the relativity theorist can explain 
how classical mechanics is false but often a good approximation to relativity. But the 
classical mechanics theorist has no explicit theory to deal with the wider problems that 
relativity tackles. 
 F13 goes on to suggest that “it will reduce imposed costs if the entrepreneur 
compensates” the people he has imposed on. But “it will normally be the case that he cannot 
compensate all these people.” And that “in turn, means that it will minimise imposed costs if 
entrepreneurs are prevented from bringing new goods to market.” Therefore, “on (L), 
maximising liberty requires draconian regulations which stifle all innovation and secure a 
stagnant and closed society, which in turn requires a totalitarian state” which is “inconsistent 
with free-market anarchy and with maximising welfare, and is also plainly inconsistent with 
the principal commonsense understanding of interpersonal liberty” (64). As we have seen, all 
this is based on a complete misunderstanding of the theory, and shows no grasp even of the 
problem that the theory sets out to solve. 
F13 then discusses and rejects the idea that “manipulated wants” can help here. But 
no help is needed and manipulated wants are irrelevant. And so there is no need to analyse 
F13‟s discussion. 
In concluding this section F13 asserts that “Lester‟s argument that maximising liberty 
(as he conceives it) is equivalent to maximising welfare fails” (64). It is not completely clear 
what “equivalent” means here. L12 does not hold that there is an a priori equivalence. Rather, 
there is a very high level of both theoretical and empirical congruence as regards their 
systematic and practical observance. And nothing that F13 has argued refutes this. 
F13 appears to accept L12‟s paraphrased view that “that the literature of free-market 
economics makes a powerful case that liberty promotes welfare” (64-65). However, F13‟s 
expression “makes a powerful case” needs to be read as “provides explanations that 
withstand severe criticism” rather than as any kind of epistemological support. And how can 
F13 agree with the point about liberty when it has rejected the given theory of liberty while 
providing no theory of its own? Moreover, F13 also then writes of “welfare (using any 
ordinary conception of welfare)”. This appears to imply a rejection of L12‟s theory of welfare 
merely by citing virtually any “conception” that accords with common sense.  
 
6. Reply to “6. Conclusion” 
 
F13 concludes by asserting that “analysis shows” that L12‟s “conception of liberty as an 
absence of imposed cost ... is not consistent with: any ordinary sense of liberty; libertarian 
ideas of self-ownership and private property; increasing welfare; free markets” (65). 
Fortunately, analysis of F13‟s faulty analysis shows precisely the opposite. 
 F13 goes on to assert that “increasing liberty, in Lester‟s sense ...  would not only 
require illiberal measures, but would even require stagnation enforced by a totalitarian state” 
(65). As we have seen, this is not a sound interpretation of the theory. But a glaring question 
arises from that assertion: what is F13‟s alternative, non-normative, theory of what is liberal 
or “illiberal” that solves the problem of how liberty relates to property? There is no answer 
whatsoever in F13, or even an appreciation of the problem. 
The pre-propertarian theory of libertarian liberty is clearly far more philosophically 
complicated than the orthodox propertarian theory. And if propertarian libertarians can 
understand the theory at all, or even what the problem is, then they will not like the 
interpersonally compared subjective elements or the looser connection with absolute private 
property (with the apparent danger of a „slippery slope‟ to modern liberalism, or even worse 
horrors). That simply cannot be helped. As Einstein is paraphrased to have said (apparently 
expressing a warning about abusing Ockham‟s razor): “Everything should be made as simple 
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